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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
VICTORIA L. BUYERS, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs- Case No. 16160 
DANNY G. BUYERS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
The plaintiff-respondent, Victoria L. Buyers, filed a 
Verified Petition to Modify a Divorce Decree. The defendant-
appellant, Danny G. Buyers, filed an Answer to that Petition 
and filed a Motion to Set Visitation Privileges with the 
parties' minor child. The issues thus joined were heard by 
the Court's Domestic Relations Division. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Court defined Mr. Buyers' visitation privileges, 
which issues are not on appeal. It also modified, or by 
respondent's view interpreted, a divorce decree to accellerate 
by approximately one year a stipulated Court Order to increase 
child support, without an allegation or showing of a material 
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change of circumstance. The Court also retroactively 
applied this ruling and awarded a Judgment for back 
support. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The defendant-appellant seeks reversal of the Order of 
the Lower Court amending the Decree of Divorce and the 
Judgment for "delinquent support," based on the retroactive 
application of that Amendment to the Decree of Divorce. 
STATR~ENT OF FACTS 
In viewing the facts in a light most favorable for the 
prevailing party below, they demonstrate the following: 
1. The parties to this litigation were heretofore inter-
married, but divorced pursuant to a Decree of Divorce dated 
April 9, 1976. (R-16). 
2. The aforestated Decree of Divorce was entered into 
pursuant to a Property Settlement Agreement, Stipulation and 
Waiver prepared by the plaintiff-respondent's (Mrs. Buyers') 
attorney. (R-10-12). This Stipulation was executed by 
the defendant-appellant, Danny G. Buyers on or about 
March 9, 1976, while he was unrepresented by counsel. The 
Stipulation was entered into without the advice of counsel 
by Mr. Buyers because of his lack of funds and because he 
and his wife had reached an agreement as to an equitable 
division of their meager assets. (R-10-12; R-71)). 
3. With reference to the matters in controversary, the 
Stipulation provided that Mr. Buyers would pay $50.00 per 
month as child support through the month of July 1976. 
-2-
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Thereafter, he would pay the sum of $20.00 per month cash as 
child support, plus make the payments of approximately 
$86.36 due on a 1975 Toyota automobile, which vehicle was 
awarded to Mrs. Buyers. In addition thereto, the defendant 
was also required to keep in full force and effect auto-
mobile insurance for the estimated three and one-half years 
it would take to liquidate the loan. (R-10, 11; cf. Decree 
of Divorce at R-20). 
4. The defendant-appellant was also required to assume 
and pay all the outstanding debts and obligations incurred by 
the parties to the date of the filing of the Complaint, in-
cluding the debts of the Salt Lake City Firemen's Credit 
Union, the Salt Lake City Employment Credit Union and 
others. (See Stipulation, R-11 and Decree of Divorce R-20). 
5. The defendant-appellant, Mr. Buyers, maintained the 
insurance policy on the car as per the Stipulation and Decree. 
In addition, he kept current the obligation on the automobile 
loan which was scheduled for final liquidation approximately 
in May 1979. This final payoff date was approximately 
three years and one month after the entry of the Decree of 
Divorce and three years, two months from the date the Stip-
ulation was executed by Mr. Buyers. (R-70, 74, 75; cf. De-
cree of Divorce and Stipulation at R-10, 12). 
6. The Court entered an Order modifying the Decree of 
Divorce and awarded the plaintiff-respondent, Mrs. Buyers, 
a back judgment of $400.00 by ruling that the car had been 
-3-
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paid off on May 1, 1978. It also ruled that to the date 
of the Hearing, the defendant-respondent owed an increased 
sum of support. (R-30). The Court, further, ordered the 
defendant to pay, subsequent to the hearing, the sum of 
$100.00 per month. (R-30). 
7. The said Order was made without there being any 
allegation in the Petition for the Hearing that there had 
been a material change of circumstance or any factual 
demonstration that there had been such a material change 
of circumstance to justify the modification of the previous 
Stipulation and Decree of Divorce. (R-1 through 82). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THERE EXISTS NO CREDIBLE EVIDENCE FOR THE COURT TO 
ENTER A FINDING THAT THE INTENT OF THE DECREE OF DIVORCE 
WAS TO HAVE THE CAR LOAN A!1.."10RTIZED OVER A PERIOD OF T\vO 
YEARS, CONTRARY TO ITS EXPRESS PROVISIONS. FURTHER, THERE 
WERE NO CREDIBLE FACTS TO SUPPORT THE COURT'S FINDING 
THAT THE LOAN OBLIGATIONS HAD BEEN PAID AS OF MAY 1978. 
The facts are undisputed that these parties entered into 
a Stipulation concerning support and a division of their 
assets. (See Findings of Fact 2 and 3). Further, it is 
not in dispute that Mr. Buyers did not obtain the services 
of an attorney; rather, he relied on the draftsmanship 
of Mrs. Buyers' attorney because of his poverty. The un-
rebutted testimony concerning this point is as follows: 
"(Buyers) It's just that simple. I 
went to her lawyer's office with her and 
we discussed several things, and this is 
the last I heard of it. I didn't have a 
lawyer so I didn't go. 
-4-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"Q. (Cutler) But your understanding 
when you talked to the lawyer was that 
you were going to pay off the full debt 
on the Toyota? 
"A. (Buyers) That's right. 
"Q. (Cutler) Is that correct? 
"A. (Buyers) That is what it says in the 
Decree, yes, Sir. I would pay off, and then 
at that time, at the end of the pay off time, 
then the child support would be $100.00 per 
month, which I agreed to. 
"Q. (Cutler) And which you assumed would 
be the pay-out of that loan, about three and 
one-half years later, is that correct? 
"A. (Buyers) Right. And since that time, 
like it says in the record, I have only 
added (to the car loan) $100.00. So I figured 
that would be a month. So I would be more than 
happy to pay (the increased child support pay-
ments at the end of the car loan). A month 
before it (the loan ammortization date) expired. 
"Q. (Cutler) When will this loan be paid off 
by your computation? 
"A. (Buyers) May 1979 according to the record. 
(R-70). 
Thus, it is clear that it was the plaintiff-respondent, 
Mrs. Buyers' lawyer who prepared the Stipulation, Findings 
of Fact and Decree of Divorce. It was her lawyer that 
computed the approximately three and one-half year pay-out 
on the car loan mentioned in that Agreement and Decree. 
That Decree specifically provides that Mr. Buyers would 
pay $50.00 per month as child support through the month of 
July 1976. Thereafter the defendant was to pay the plain-
tiff's automobile insurance, pay the sum of $86.36 on the 
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1975 Toyota automobile awarded Mrs. Buyers and keep 
the insurance in effect during that period. In addition, 
he was to pay $20.00 cash per month child support. The 
Decree adopted by the Court, pursuant to the Stipulation 
prepared by Mrs. Buyers' attorney, specifically provided: 
"The defendant is ordered to pay to the 
plaintiff the sum of $50.00 per month 
child support through and including the 
month of July 1976, and thereafter to pay 
to the plaintiff the sum of $20.00 per 
month as child support, and is further 
ordered to make payments in the approximate 
sum of $86.36 on the 1975 Toyota automobile, 
and to keep in full force and effect the 
automobile insurance now in force on said 
vehicle until payment for said vehilce [sic] 
is completed, which is estimated to be 
approximately 3 l/2 years. Further, after 
the defendant has completed the payment 
on sa1d veh1cle, then he is ordered to pay 
the plaintiff the sum of $100.00 per month 
as child support." (Decree of DivorceR 17 
cf. Stipulat1on, R-10, ll). (Emphasis added). 
Hrs. Buyers attempted at the Hearing subject of this 
appeal, to establish that the 1975 Toyota automobile had 
been paid off in April 1978, approximately two years after 
the entry of the Decree. It was not alleged that there 
was a lump sum payment. Rather, an attempt was made to 
limit the outstanding automobile principal loan balance 
at the date of the Decree, to the $2,587.65. Thus, by 
ammortizing only approximately 60% of the debt at the 
rate of $86.36 per month, the pay-ou~ date was advanced 
by one year. 
This slight o£ ~and trick \vas p~e:nise·::: en t~e assu.."T:?~.:..::::. 
by a lean o~~ice~ =~at a po~ticn of t~e loan balance ~as 
not attributable to ~he ~ovota ca= obliqa~lon. 
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the unrebutted testimony of Mr. Buyers was that the entire 
loan balance was for the Toyota purchase. His unrebutted 
testimony was as follows: 
"(Buyers) In April, I believe, 1975 we pur-
chased a 1975 Toyota Corolla. At that time 
we had in our possession a 1974 Dodge Colt 
station wagon, which was financed by the Salt 
Lake City Firemen's Credit Union. There was 
a balance owing on the 1974 Dodge Colt station 
wagon. We traded the Dodge Colt station wagon 
in on the Toyota, the 1975 Toyota. 1·/e went 
to the Credit Union to get the loan. They 
loaned us the $2,500.00 for the Toyota, plus 
they added on the balance owing for the 1974 
Dodge Colt. The purchase price of the Toyota 
Corolla was more than $2,500.00. It was in 
fact $3,500.00. 
"Q. (Cutler) So how much did you owe on this 
Toyota, including the debt you had on the Dodge 
Colt trade-ln that you retalned and consolldated 
in this, as well as the purchase price, as lt 
was shown, of $2,500.00 on the Toyota? 
"(Buyers) It seems to me that the total loan 
was $4,000.00, at least $4,000.00, because the 
purchase price of the car was $3,500.00 for the 
1975 Toyota. 
"Q. (Cutler) And with the interest do 
you think it was around $4,000.00? 
"A. (Buyers) Yes, sir." 
R-71). (Emphasis added). 
(R-68, 69; see also 
Thereafter, ~r. Clinton Barker, the manager of the Salt 
La~e Ci~y Firemen's c~edit Cnion, was called to the stand by 
:-:::. 3u:.-,.e::.--s' c0'..1..'1se:l. <:'.J exa::-~.:.!'le ~is earl:..er ":estimony in light 
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he had not used the total purchase price of the Toyota 
automobile. Rather, he had only included the supplemental 
loan figure of $2,500.00. Under examination he admitted 
that he was in error and should have used both figures, 
stating: 
"Q. (Cutler) So the total amount that 
would have been owed on the Toyota would 
have been the 25 ($2,500) plus the 15 
($1,500), right, on the car? 
(Mr. Barker) " -- the loan was covered by his 
shares and his signature and the Toyota. 
"Q. (Cutler) Right. But the total amount then 
was 25 plus the-rs;-right, on the car? 
"A. (Barker) Right." (R-74) (Emphasis added). 
Mr. Barker then, under examination, admitted that 
amrnortizing the loan at approximately $86 per month for the 
purchase price of the car would take at least three and 
one-half years. He stated: 
"Q. (Cutler) So that if you applied both 
of them (the $1,500 loan for the Dodge trade-
in on the Toyota and the supplemental loan for 
the purchase price of the remaining balance on 
the Toyota) at $86.00, that would take it out 
about three-and-a-half years to pay them both 
off at $86 per month, isn't that correct? 
"A. (Barker) Probably longer." (R-75) 
Thus, the record is absolutely clear that the appellant, 
Hr. Buyers, stipulated and agreed to pay to the plaintiff as 
support: {a) $86.00 on an automobile awarded to 11rs. 
Buyers; (b) keep the insurance on that automobile; (c) pay 
-8-
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$20.00 per month cash as support, for approximately three 
and one-half years it would take to arnrnortize the $4,000 
loan for the purchase of that automobile (including the 
debt remaining on the "trade-in" used as a down payment 
on the Toyota vehicle), and (d) pay sundry debts of the par-
ties. That Stipulation and Decree embodying that under-
standing was prepared by the respondent's, Mrs. Buyers' 
own attorney. Also, the loan officer testified that it 
would take at least three and one-half years at that rate 
of payment to amrnortize the loan. 
Therefore, there can be no confusion or ambiguity upon 
which the Court could possibly find to interpret the previous 
Decree to provide for a two (2) year pay-out rather than the 
3 1/2 years agreed between the parties. 
There being no ambiguity in the intent of the parties 
and the intent of the Court in rendering its Decree of 
Divorce Order concerning support, the Lower Court's obli-
gation was to review whether the defendant was in default 
under the terms of that Order. There was no allegation of 
a default and no facts presented to support such an asser-
tion. Mr. Buyers was fully current on his obligation which 
by the only evidence in the record would be paid off in May 
1979. 
It is respectfully submitted that the Lower Court erred 
and abused it's discretion in finding that the car loan was, 
in fact, paid off in two years and that the defendant owed 
an obligation of increased child support retroactive four 
-9-
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months from the date of the hearing. Such an Order, in 
substance, modified the Decree of Divorce and imposed an 
additional obligation of $80.00 per month for a one year 
period. Thus the decision should be overturned. 
POINT II 
THERE WAS NO ALLEGATION AND NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT AN 
ASSERTION THAT THERE \·lAS A ~ATERIAL CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCE; 
THUS, THE COURT ERRED IN MODIFYING THE DECREE OF DIVORCE. 
As more fully discussed in Point I above, the decision 
of the Court constituted an Amendment of the Decree of 
Divorce. The Amendment, in substance, provided that Mr. 
Buyers would be required to pay off the debt owed on the 
car awarded to Hrs. Buyers; however, it added the provision 
that after two years he would, in addition, be required to 
pay $100.00 per month for support, instead of the previous 
Order of $20.00 per month. 
The laws are so abundantly clear, it hardly requires 
recitation. However, the following cites are given for the 
Court's convenient reference which clearly hold that one 
District Judge may not overrule another District Judge; 
rather, those matters must be appealed. State v. ~1organ, 
527 P2d. 525 (Utah 1974); Peterson v. Peterson, 530 P2d. 
821 (Utah 1974); In Re Mecham, 537 P2d. 312. 
Further, with reference to Domestic Relations matters, 
one Judge may not alter the decision of another, until there 
has been demonstrated a substantial material change of 
circumstance. This Court has clearly stated: 
"In as much as the rights of the parties 
-10-
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have been adjudicated on the basis of the 
facts shown to exist at the time of the 
divorce, there can be no jusitifcation 
for changing the Decree unless there is 
a showing of substantial change in circum-
stances." Owen v. Owen, 579 P2d. 911 (Utah 1978) 
citing Ring v. Rlng, 29 Ut.2d. 436, 511 P2d. 155 
(1973). 
Such a requirement exists despite the fact that there may 
even have been an increase of income as demonstrated in the 
Owen case above cited. Significantly, in the instant action, 
there was not even an allegation that any such material 
change of circumstance existed. Further, the Court 
specifically failed to make any such Finding. In fact, there 
was no evidence presented to justify any such Finding. See 
Amended Order of the Lower Court, Judge Harding, at R-33-35. 
Thus, it is respectfully submitted that the Lower Court 
eerred in modifying the Decree of Divorce abasent a showing 
and allegation of a material change of circumstance. 
POINT III 
ANY AMBIGUITIES IN THE CONTRACT STIPULATION AND THE 
DECREE SHOULD BE RESOLVED AGAINST THE PARTY WHO DRAFTED IT. 
As demonstrated in the Statement of Facts, the appellant, 
Mr. Buyers, was not represented by counsel; rather, he 
relied on his wife's attorney to memorialize their agreement. 
This was done to his satisfaction (as a non-lawyer) and he 
executed a Stipulation, upon which the Decree of Divorce was 
entered. 
The record clearly demonstrates that the respondent 
allowed the defendant to rely on the Stipulation and the 
Decree of Divorce for two years before attempting to assert 
-11-
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that the loan would be paid out in two, rather than three 
and one-half years. This delay was obviously done with the 
full knowledge that the total loan would not be ammortized 
until approximately May 1979. 
The law is clear that any ambiguities in a contract should 
be resolved against the party drafting it, particularly where 
the drafting party is represented by an attorney and the other 
is a lay person. Guinand v. Walton, 22 Ut.2d. 196, 450 P2d. 467. 
Skousen v. Smith, 27 Ut.2d. 169, 493 P2d. 1003 (1972). 
Further, it is respectfully submitted that the law is 
equally clear that one should not be able to reap the benefits 
of a bargain and allow the other party to detrimentally rely 
on his agreement and understanding for an excess of two years 
and then seek to retroactively modify that agreement and 
subject the defendant to substantially increase financial 
obligations. See Morgan v. Board of State Lands, 549 P2d. 695 
(Utah 1976). Hanson v. Beehive Security Co., 14 Ut.2d. 157, 
380 P2d. 66, 67 (Ut.l963); Migliaccio v. Davis, 232 P2d. 195, 
198 (Ut. 1951). 
It is respectfully submitted that any ambiguities in the 
agreement or understanding between these parties should be 
resolved against the respondent, Mrs. Buyers. She should be 
estopped to deny the pay-out of this loan and the increased 
child support should commence in May 1979, not in May 1978. 
Thus, the Lower Court's decision should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
There has been no material change of circumstance since 
the entry of the Decree. As such, it cannot be modified by 
the Lower Court. 
-12-
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Further, the agreement and Stipulation between the 
parties, which was prepared by respondent's attorney and 
upon which the appellant, (Mr. Buyers) relied, provided that 
he would be given a reduced cash obligation, provided he 
paid off an existing loan obligation on a vehicle awarded to 
Mrs. Buyers. The respondent should be estopped to deny the 
validity of that agreement. Further, any ambiguities regarding 
the agreement and Order should be strictly construed against 
Mrs. Buyers, in that it was prepared by her counsel. 
Thus, the Lower Court's decision modifying the Decree 
of Divorce should be reversed and the defendant-appellant, 
Mr. Buyers,should be awarded his costs and attorney's fees 
in prosecuting this appeal. 
-13-
Respectfully submitted, 
Roaer F. Cutler, Attorney for 
Defendant-Appellant 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
